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Lethal Autonomous Weapons and
Jus ad Bellum Proportionality
Heather M. Roff 1
Much of the debate over the moral permissibility of using
autonomous weapons systems (AWS) focuses on issues related to
their use during war (jus in bello), and whether those systems can
uphold the principles of proportionality and distinction. This
essay, however, argues that we ought to consider how a state’s
portended use of AWS in conflict would affect jus ad bellum
principles, particularly the principle of proportionality. The essay
argues that even the clearest case of a defensive war against an
unjust aggressor would prohibit going to war if the war was waged
with AWS. The use of AWS to fight an unjust aggressor would
adversely affect the ability for peaceful settlement and
negotiations, as well as have negative second-order effects on the
international system and third party states. In particular, the use
of AWS by one state would likely start and arms race and
proliferate weapons throughout the system.
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“We have to conduct battles without any contact, so that our
boys do not die, and for that it is necessary to use war robots.”—
Dimitry Rogozin, Deputy Prime Minister of Russia 2
1.

Heather M. Roff is a Visiting Professor at the Josef Korbel School of
International Studies at the University of Denver. She is a research fellow
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of Waterloo and the United States Air Force Academy. Her research
interests pertain to international ethics, security and emerging
technologies, particularly lethal autonomous weapons, unmanned
systems, and cybersecurity. She is also interested in the Responsibility to
Protect doctrine, international humanitarian law, and the philosophy of
Immanuel Kant. She is author of Global Justice, Kant and the
Responsibility to Protect (Routledge, 2013), and over a dozen articles
including “The Strategic Robot Problem” Journal of Military Ethics
(2014) and “Gendering a Warbot” International Feminist Journal of
Politics (2015, forthcoming). She is currently writing a monograph on
autonomous weapons systems.

2.

Combat Robots to Become Russian Army New Recruits, VOICE RUSS.
(May 30, 2014, 5:28 PM), http://voiceofrussia.com/news/ 2014_05_30/
Combat-robots-to-become-Russian-army-new-recruits-1788/.
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“The DoD of FY2011-2036 Unmanned Systems Integrated
Roadmap observes that warfighters continue to value the
inherent features of unmanned systems, especially their
persistence, versatility, and reduced risk to human life.”—United
States Department of Defense 3

I. Introduction
The above sentiments about saving troops’ lives underlie much of
the debate and perceived advantages of lethal Autonomous Weapons
Systems (AWS). AWS are armed weapons systems, capable of learning
and adapting their “functioning in response to changing circumstances
in the environment in which [they are] deployed,” as well as capable of
making firing decisions on their own. 4 While it is certainly rare to see
a fully candid statement regarding the desirability of saving one’s own
troops, such sentiments are among the motivating factors for the
development and deployment of AWS. 5 Most scholarly arguments over
the legal and moral permissibility of lethal AWS, however, do not cite
these purely self-interested reasons, but focus instead on whether AWS
are capable of upholding jus in bello principles, particularly the
principles of distinction and proportionality. Proponents often cite that
machines will be better able to distinguish between combatants and
noncombatants than human soldiers. Furthermore, since machines are
not affected by emotions, they will refrain from engaging in retributive
acts against civilian populations. 6 Detractors argue the opposite, citing
the difficulty of telling the difference between combatants and
noncombatants, particularly in counterinsurgency wars. Moreover, they
argue that such AWS will be unable to fight proportionately because
the judgment required for such calculations is beyond the programming

3.

DEF. SCI. BD., U.S. DEF. DEP’T., TASK FORCE REPORT: THE ROLE OF
AUTONOMY IN DOD SYSTEMS 81 (2012), available at http://
www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/AutonomyReport.pdf [hereinafter DOD
TASK FORCE REPORT].

4.

INT’L COMM. RED CROSS [ICRC], 31ST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
THE RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 39 (2011),

available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/report/31international-conference-ihl-challenges-report-2011-10-31.htm.

5.

See DOD TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note _, at 81–82, 85 (2012) (noting
the “reduced risk” to loss of life in almost each instance of a “benefit” to
these systems).

6.

See Kenneth Anderson & Matthew C. Waxman, Law and Ethics for Robot
Soldiers 11–12 (Col. L. Sch. Pub. L. & L. Theory Working Grp., Working
Paper No. 12-313, 2012); see also Gary E. Marchant et al., International
Governance of Autonomous Military Robots, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L.
REV. 272 (2011).
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and learning capacities of these systems. 7 They claim that in bello
proportionality is context-dependent, and artificial intelligence now and
for the foreseeable future is unable to make such difficult judgment
calls. 8 There is some discussion of the importance of risk to human
warfighters, but this mostly concerns the impact of AWS on aspects of
military virtue. 9
This debate is an important one and should not be dismissed
lightly. However, I would like to ask another question about the moral
permissibility of AWS, namely, whether AWS is compatible with jus
ad bellum. In particular, is it permissible to wage war knowing that it
will be fought with these systems? I argue that AWS pose a distinct
challenge to jus ad bellum principles, particularly the principle of
proportionality. I will attempt to show that even in the case of a
defensive war, we cannot satisfy the ad bellum principle of
proportionality if we knowingly plan to use lethal autonomous systems
during hostilities because of the likely effects on war termination and
the achievement of one’s just causes.
My argument has two parts. First, I briefly outline ad bellum
principles and offer the clearest case of a just defensive war. Second, I
argue that ad bellum proportionality calculations require us to look
beyond a one-round game with an enemy force to the overall
consequences of a war. In particular, one must not merely look to the
counterfactual of not fighting, but what the war as a whole will look
like as well as to the probable consequences that will result. In this way,
I follow Thomas Hurka’s conception of proportionality, arguing that it
7.

See Heather M. Roff, The Strategic Robot Problem, 13 J. MIL. ETHICS 211,
219–221 (2014).

8.

The terminology on both sides of the debate is not consistent. Asaro and
Arkin, for example, discuss the principle of distinction, whereas Noel
Sharkey discusses the principle of discrimination. See, e.g., ETHICS OF 21ST
CENTURY MILITARY CONFLICT 260–262 (E. L. Gaston & Patti Tamara
Lenard eds.) (2012); Peter Asaro, On Banning Lethal Autonomous
Systems: Human Rights, Automation and the Dehumanizing of Lethal
Decision-Making, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 687–709 (2012); Robert
Sparrow, The Turing Triage Test 6 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 203–213 (2004);
see also Robert Sparrow, Killer Robots 24 J. APPLIED PHIL. 62–77 (2007);
Robert Sparrow, Robotic Weapons and the Future of War, NEW WARS
AND NEW SOLDIERS: MILITARY ETHICS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD
117–133 (Paolo Tripodi & Jessica Wolfendale eds.) (2011); Noel Sharkey,
Grounds for Discrimination: Autonomous Robot Weapons, 11 RUSI DEF.
SYS. 86, 86–89 (2008); Noel Sharkey, The Ethical Frontiers of Robotics
322 SCIENCE 1800–01 (2008).

9.

See KILLING BY REMOTE CONTROL: THE ETHICS OF AN UNMANNED
MILITARY 86–105 (Bradley James ed.) (2013); see also CHRISTIAN
ENEMARK, ARMED DRONES AND THE ETHICS OF WAR: MILITARY VIRTUE IN
A POST-HEROIC AGE (2013), available at http://www.ewidgetsonline.net/
dxreader/Reader.aspx?token=b6c16f34905245f08442982fbd8df93c&rand
=538351197&buyNowLink=&page=&chapter=.
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is inherently tied to all other ad bellum principles. 10 Thus if one cannot
satisfy proportionality, the other principles will fall, like a line of
dominos, along with it.

II. Jus ad Bellum
Jus ad bellum is traditionally comprised of six principles: just cause,
right intention, proper authority, last resort, the probability of success,
and proportionality. Just cause provides the relevant normative reason
to wage war, such as self-defense or defense of others, while right
intention prescribes the proper reasons for acting. For instance, I may
be unjustly threatened with war, thereby providing a just cause, but
engaging in “defensive” war with an eye toward colonizing or annexing
the aggressor state’s territory is clearly impermissible. One’s intentions
in fighting must match one’s publicly announced or official reasons for
fighting.
The principle of proper (or sometimes legitimate) authority states
that only legitimately recognized authorities may declare war. In the
middle ages, this was clearly the province of princes. Today, it is the
province of sovereign states. 11 One prominent criticism of the principle
of proper authority comes from the direction of non-state actors.
International law, for example, does not accord any privileges to these
actors, but does place obligations on them. 12 While it is certainly true
that states can wage war against non-state actors, the just war tradition
would not consider these non-state actors proper authorities. 13
Last resort and the probability of success are rather
straightforward. Last resort requires that states attempt all reasonable
alternatives available, such as diplomacy, arbitration, or
countermeasures, before resorting to hostilities. 14 Probability of success,
likewise, requires states to assess whether an actor is able to achieve its
10.

See Thomas Hurka, Proportionality and the Morality of War, 33 PHIL.&
PUB. AFF. 34, 34–66 (2005).

11.

See Joachim von Elbe, The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in
International Law, 33 AM. J. INT’L L. 665, 665 (1939).

12.

ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS
189 (2006).

13.

See id. at 35. Although beyond the scope of this paper, this principle begs
the question that if all non-state actors are considered as illegitimate
authorities in war, can they ever by definition wage a just war? See id.;
but see COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 52–61 (Jean S. Pictet, ed.) (1960)
(discussing the origins of Art. 4(A)(2), which treats members of organized
militias equally to members of recognized armed forces in an armed
conflict).

14.

See Gregory Kavka, Was the Gulf War a Just War?, 22 J. SOC. PHIL. 20,
25 (1991).
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just cause through fighting. If a state is unable to do so, it would be
futile to bear the costs of war. 15
Finally, we have the principle of proportionality. Ad bellum
proportionality, as distinct from its in bello counterpart, requires that
we look to the overall consequences of a proposed war. 16 We must
engage in a forward-looking counterfactual analysis and compare “the
war and its effects to what the world would have been like had the war
not occurred.” 17 This calculation is notoriously difficult. Indeed,
scholars like Hurka argue that such calculations cannot be “made
simply or mechanically,” for not all harms are of equal weight to
potential benefits, and not all benefits are permitted in one’s analysis. 18
For instance, we cannot count the overall economic benefits of engaging
in a war, for those goods are unconnected to the relevant goods of
waging war. According to Hurka, the “relevant goods” are those that
proceed directly from, or are contained within, the just causes. 19 I will
expand my discussion about proportionality throughout the remainder
of this essay, but for now, I will follow Hurka in assuming that we must
weigh only the relevant goods of waging war against all of the foreseen
evils of doing so.
Let us turn now to the classic case of the defensive use of force.
Unfortunately, it is not within the scope of this essay to address third
party defense, harming of bystanders, and lesser evil justifications.20
For our purposes, I will examine only a case in which an unjust
aggressor (State A) intentionally and without justification threatens the
central rights of another state (State D), namely the rights of territorial
integrity and/or state sovereignty. 21 Under a forfeiture theory of self-

15.

Hurka, supra note 9, at 35.

16.

See id. at 40.

17.

Kavka, supra note 13, at 24.

18.

See Hurka, supra note 9, at 66.

19.

Id. at 40.

20.

See generally David Rodin, Justifying Harm, 122 ETHICS 74 (2011)
(examining proportionality relationships through different harm
justifications).

21.

I am not making a distinction here between direct and conditional threats.
The threat is towards the territorial integrity and/or sovereignty of a
defending state. This could be mere political aggression to install a
different political regime, or it could be aggression against a people (e.g.
genocide), or a combination of the two. What matters in this scenario is
that the threat is primarily against the state, and that the state in
question has the ability to respond to this threat against its rights with
lethal autonomous weapons systems. For discussion about conditional and
direct threats and the objection of the “bloodless invasion” see DAVID
RODIN, WAR AND SELF-DEFENSE 131–33 (2002); Seth Lazar, National
Defense, Self-Defense, and the Problem of Political Aggression, in
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defense, State A loses its right not to be harmed by threatening an
imminent violation State D’s rights. State D may inflict harm on State
A to thwart an attack against it and to potentially restore State D’s
rights. The harm inflicted on State A must be necessary and
proportionate. As noted above, only those benefits related to the just
cause of defense will count in an ad bellum proportionality calculation,
but all foreseen harms are included.
In the classic defensive scenario, most international lawyers,
politicians, and some just war theorists would claim that State D is
permitted to use proportionate force to thwart this attack. 22 I, however,
would like to press on this intuition. In particular, in the case of an
unjust threat, is a state permitted to respond with AWS? To restrict
the case, let us assume that State D would contemplate sending only
AWS and not a combination of AWS and human troops. This
assumption prohibits us from bootstrapping additional justifications of
individual self-defense for the lives of the human combatants; it restricts
the case to one of purely robotic defense against threatened aggression.

III. Proportionality and AWS
Ostensibly, it would appear that the ability to use AWS against an
unjust threat ought to be seen as a benefit in one’s proportionality
calculation. As its proponents argue, AWS saves soldiers’ lives. This
would surely weight heavily in favor of using robotic weapons, for the
harms imposed would be placed on the unjust aggressor and not on the
combatants and/or civilians of the defending state. The harms would
be allocated to those liable to harm (i.e. the unjust aggressors).
Moreover, in the event that AWS engage in collateral killing, one could
argue that if it was in pursuance of legitimate military objectives, and
the killing was foreseen but unintended, those deaths are unfortunate
but not prohibited given the doctrine of double effect. 23
MORALITY OF DEFENSIVE WAR 13–14, 22–24 (Seth Lazar & Cécile Fabre
eds., 2014).
22.

The collectivist position would support a defensive response. The
reductivist, however, may not. Collectivists hold that the state has an
independent value from its members, and as such is justified in waging
war in its defense. Reductivists do not think that the state holds any
independent value that would justify collateral killing in war. Thus,
reductivists hold that individual members of the state are the locus of
value, and permissible killing must be justified through interpersonal
morality, not a collective statist one that looks to war as an “exceptional”
circumstance. For a good discussion of these positions, see Lazar, supra
note 19, at 21, 32–34.

23.

The doctrine of double effect states that collateral killing that is foreseen
but unintended is permissible in war. Michael Walzer challenges this
traditional view and wants to restrict its scope arguing for instead a
principle of “double intention.” The principle of double intention requires
combatants to have two intentions: “first, that the good [act] be achieved”
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In this scenario, call it Scenario One, State D must make a decision.
It must either fight or capitulate. If State D deems it permissible to
fight, then State D must have determined that it:: has a just cause
(defense); possesses right intention (to thwart threatened attack); is a
proper authority; has a reasonable chance of success; fights because this
option is a last resort; deems the war proportionate, given the gravity
of the threat and D’s ability to displace harms to the unjust aggressor.
The decision tree for Scenario One would look something like this:
Scenario One in a one round game at Time T 1 :
T1: State A issues direct threat to State D

Respond with AWS

Capitulate

This choice is certainly seductive.

State D may fight against an unjust threat without any harm to its
human troops or civilian population. However, I fear that this decision
relies too heavily on a presumption that a state’s technological
advantage provides a justification to fight where a state might not
otherwise do so. The crux of the matter is that a state must justify the
harms imposed by claiming there is a net benefit to be gained from any
hostile actions. Furthermore, the benefits are, and indeed must be,
directly related to the just causes, and achieving those causes must be
reasonably likely to happen.
On most accounts, thwarting aggression is seen as a sufficient just
cause. 24 This is because an attacking army places all those in its path
at risk of imminent harm. The harm (to state or people or both)
threatened is temporally impending, and this temporal element is
important. In most theories of self-defense, there is no justification to
inflict harm in self-defense unless the harm threatened is imminent and

and “second, that the foreseeable evil be reduced as far as possible.” In
the course of conventional war, this would require combatants to take on
more risks to themselves to mitigate the harm to noncombatants.
MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 155 (1977).
24.

Jeff McMahan & Robert McKim, The Just War and the Gulf War, 23
CAN. J. PHIL. 501, 502–506 (1993) (asserting that stopping current
aggression, whether to halt conflict or prevent future aggressions, is a just
cause, while solely preventing future aggressions is not a just cause).
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directed at one’s vital interests. 25 In typologies of war, imminence is
what marks the difference between preventive and preemptive war. If
there is any distinction between the two typologies, then the temporal
element cannot be ignored.
Yet in the case of defense with AWS, this imminence is subtly
transmuted. In conventional war, we look to the three loci of imminent
harm: the state, the human combatants, and the people. International
law and the just war theory claim that imminent harm to the state
entails that its political independence and territorial integrity is
threatened, and the threat is sufficient to shed blood. 26 In practice,
however, there is not a clean or clear distinction between imminent
harm to the state’s interests and the people’s because, on most
accounts, imminent harm is always bootstrapped to human combatants
and the civilian population (if the defending military fails). While just
war theorists would like to keep these categories separate, often they
become mixed, and justifications of national self-defense are rooted in
cases of individual self-defense. 27
The ability to respond defensively with AWS, however, changes the
calculation or at least lays bare the real loci of harm. For there is, and
can be, no lethal threat to an AWS, and there are only secondary or
tertiary threats to State D’s human troops or civilians. In regards to
25.

For a list of states permitting self-defense only in response to an
“imminent” threat, see PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES §
131(b)(3) n.16 (1984). The Model Penal Code requires the force used by
the defendant to be “immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting
himself against the use of unlawful force... on the present occasion.”
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1985). In State v. Norman, the state also
found that the threat must be serious or grave enough to justify using
lethal force in response. See State v. Norman, 324 N.C. 253, 266, 378
S.E.2d 8, 16 (1989). Of course in international law threats against a state
are all seen as impermissible and prohibited by the United Nations
Charter, Art. 2(4). However, in international law, for a state to
legitimately and legally respond, the state must be the victim of an armed
attack, and not a mere use of or threat of force (Art. 51). Morally, of
course, one may want to claim that one does not need to wait for an
attack to happen or be underway, but merely be “imminent.” This would
be to condone anticipatory self-defense or preemptive war, while
prohibiting preventive war. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; art. 51.

26.

See U.N. Charter art. 51 (allowing U.N. member states to use military
force for the purposes of self-defense).

27.

See for example President Reagan’s speech to the American people
justifying attacking Libya in 1986: “When our citizens are abused or
attacked anywhere in the world on the direct orders of a hostile regime,
we will respond so long as I’m in this Oval Office. Self-defense is not only
our right, it is our duty. It is the purpose behind the mission undertaken
tonight, a mission fully consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter.” Ronald Reagan, U.S. President, Address to the Nation on the
United States Air Strike Against Libya (Apr. 14, 1986), available at
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1986/41486g.htm.
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AWS, if one were to discuss “imminent harm” here, one would have to
rely on arguments concerning property damage. Moreover, common law
and US jurisprudence prohibit using lethal force in defense of
property. 28 While some US states permit their citizens to kill wild
animals in defense of property, no such exception exists for the killing
of human beings. 29 While this article addresses the national defense of
a state in war, a similar rationale could apply to the principle of
defensive killing. Defensive killing is permitted only when the threats
are grave enough and imminent enough to tip the proportionality
scale. 30 In the case of defense with AWS, the brute fact is that a robotic
army stands in place of human warfighters and thus mitigates the
imminence of the harm to the vital interests of the people of the
defending state.
One might object here and claim that all I have done is lay bare
the fact that the imminence of the threat is to the state, and it is the
threat to the state that justifies killing in defense regardless of how or
by what means that killing is carried out. In deciding the proportionate
response, the state must balance whatever harms it imposes against the
good of maintaining its rights. In this case, the state claims that a
threat to its enumerated rights supports waging war against an unjust
aggressor, which typically entails sacrificing the lives of its service
members as well as collaterally killing bystanders in the aggressor
nation. In Scenario One, State D is merely using a weapon that does
not require it to sacrifice its service members.
However, to satisfy the proportionality principle, State D would
then need to justify wide ranging and harmful responses. That is, State
D ought to have a reasonable expectation that it can achieve the
relevant goods, and thereby either equal or outweigh the potential evils
resulting from war against State A. The only value against which State
D can base this calculation is its rights. If one holds that a state’s rights
permits waging war with human soldiers carrying traditional weapons
and not only AWS, then we must revise the scenario, to include the
potential that AWS will fail, and human warfighters will be utilized in
a second round. The game tree would look something like this:
28.

Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights of Self-Defense and Defense
of Property, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 400, 400 (2007).

29.

See Ron A. Bender, The Right to Kill Wild Animals in Defense of Person
or Property, 31 MONT. L. REV. 235, 237–38 (1970); see also Katko v.
Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971) (stating that the law has always
placed a higher value upon human safety than upon mere rights in
property. It is the accepted rule that there is no privilege to use any force
calculated to cause death or serious bodily injury to repel the threat to
land or chattels, unless there is also such a threat to the defendant’s
personal safety as to justify self-defense).

30.

See, e.g., State v. Etienne, 35 A.3d 523, 537 (N.H. 2011) (“[Defensive
killing] should be resorted to only when the danger is immense in respect
of consequences and exceedingly imminent in point of time.”).
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Scenario Two:
T1: State A issues direct threat to State D

Respond with AWS

Capitulate

T2: AWS Insufficient

State D Responds with Human
Warfighters Using
Conventional Weapons

Capitulate

Yet by granting this point, we concede that our proportionality
calculations must take account of all of the harms (h) and relevant
benefits (b) at Time 1 (T 1 ) and Time 2 (T 2 ). Moreover, given the
dynamic nature of conflict, where an enemy force will change its
behavior and perceptions at T 2, such calculations cannot be overly
simplistic in that one takes the harms and benefits at T 1 and then
carries that sum over, unchanged, to T 2 . Rather, we must estimate
additional harms and benefits at T 2 as well, while noting that these
harms and benefits are dependent upon the estimated outcome of T 1 .
In other words, we must calculate proportionality in the following way,
where P is the “proportionality” of the response:
P|T2 = �b(T)|T2 − h(T)|T2 � + �b(T)|T1 − h(T)|T1 �

or, extending to an arbitrary time T N :
N

P|N = �(b(Ti ) − h(Ti ))
i=0

noting that, in general, the harms (h) and benefits (b) are
functions of time dependent on the initial conditions (i.e. the type
of response) and that total proportionality will be the sum over
all times, denoted simply as P.
For a response to be proportional, the condition on P is then
simply:
P≥0

Proportionality in this equation is greater than or equal to the sum
of benefits and harms at T 1 and T 2. This view makes the relative
considerations more complex, even at T 1, for it requires a state to make
calculations based on a strategic interaction with its adversary, as well
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as an estimation of the likely distributed effects to third parties in the
system. A strategic interaction would mean that State D estimates
what State A will do once fighting commences and then predicates its
decisions on the portended actions of State A. For example, if a
commander reasons that fighting against an adversary’s right flank will
cause it to fall back to a rear position, then the commander will try to
place troops in this area before fighting commences to anticipate his
adversary’s likely response. Instead of estimating only one scenario at
a time, a commander or state must think multiple moves ahead.
The presumption that AWS will offer an advantage where states
can “fight battles without any contact” is pernicious because it
artificially manipulates one’s sense of ad bellum proportionality by
claiming that the harms suffered are either highly mitigated or absent
because it assumes that the state using them will not face any
additional threat from its adversary. Indeed, it presumes a one round
game, and thus distorts the calculation. Indeed, it ignores the fact that,
if properly calculated, any benefits or harms identified at T 1 are
correlated with one’s perception of the state of affairs at T 2 . When
pressed, then, it is actually Scenario Two that justifies waging a
defensive war, and if one cannot justify waging war under Scenario
Two, then one cannot justify waging war at all.
While my arguments are conjectural in nature, we have prima facie
evidence to suggest that waging warfare with AWS at T 1 would
generate too many costs at T 2 to satisfy the entire proportionality
calculation. We cannot satisfy this calculation for two distinct reasons:
first, the use of AWS will adversely affect the likelihood of peaceful
settlement and the probability of achieving one’s just causes. Second,
the use of AWS in conflict would breed a system wide AWS arms race.
Let us turn to the issue of peaceful settlement and achieving just causes.
Albert Camus once remarked that killing by using a machine as a
proxy for a soldier is a danger that we ought to shun because what is
“gained in cleanliness is lost in understanding.” 31 What he meant was
that sanitizing killing on one side and attempting to legitimize this
supposedly clean form of violence is myopic because one can never kill
cleanly. There will undoubtedly be consequences that will entrench the
violence and perpetuate the cycle. Leaping ahead approximately sixty
years, we see that Camus’ observations still hold true and are
increasingly prescient for the types of autonomous killing under
discussion. Recent evidence from the United States’ use of unmanned
aerial vehicles, or “drones,” in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia to target
members of al-Qaeda and its affiliates suggests that using this type of
weapon breeds more animosity and acts as a recruiting strategy for
31.

ALBERT CAMUS, Neither Victims nor Executioners: Saving Bodies, in
CAMUS AT COMBAT: WRITING 1944–1947 255, 255–77 (Jacqueline LéviValensi ed., 2006).
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terrorist organizations, thereby frustrating the U.S.’s goals. 32 Indeed,
the U.S.’s adversaries paint its use of unmanned systems as
disrespectful and cowardly, and this belief, in turn, incites distrust,
skepticism, and hatred in the target population. 33 What may be gained
in cleanliness is lost in understanding.
While these current unmanned operations still require human
combatants in the combat theater at forward operating bases or
airstrips, they are not wholly clean or without risk. AWS, on the other
hand, would permit a state to excise the human from this kind of
combat situation, and may eliminate the need for any support crew in
theater. The perception of clean killing would increase. Thus, any
findings we have about a target population’s perception of unmanned
drones may actually be even stronger in the case of AWS. Even if AWS
are used defensively, the message it sends to one’s adversary is that
their lives are not worth sending a human combatant to fight. This
perception, along with evidence from present drone operations, suggests
that feelings of animosity may increase as a result of AWS use.
Acrimonious feelings affect the likelihood of peaceful settlement and
negotiation between belligerent states. Substantial evidence indicates
that when high levels of distrust, enmity, and hatred exist between
warring parties, conflicts are prolonged and peaceful settlements are
unlikely. 34 Data suggests that when belligerent parties begin to relate
32.

See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION CLINIC AT
STANFORD LAW SCHOOL AND GLOBAL JUSTICE CLINIC AT NYU SCHOOL OF
LAW, LIVING UNDER DRONES: DEATH, INJURY AND TRAUMA TO CIVILIANS
FROM US DRONE PRACTICES IN PAKISTAN (2012), available at
http://www.livingunderdrones.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/
Stanford-NYU-Living-Under-Drones.pdf; see also Hassan Abbas, How
Drones Create More Terrorists: Militants Take Advantage of Fearful
Communities to Draw New Recruits, ATLANTIC (Aug. 23, 2013, 9:06 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2013/08/howdrones-create-more-terrorists /278743/.

33.

See generally supra note 31.

34.

Political scientists find that in civil wars, or intrastate wars, where there
is typically an indivisible good and high levels of distrust, peace
negotiations are not as likely to occur as interstate conflicts. Peace
settlement does seem to differ in terms of type and intensity of conflict.
In interstate conflict, Slantchev identifies that 67 out of 104 interstate
wars ended in negotiated settlement between 1816 and 1991. Civil or
intrastate conflict, however, is far less. See Branislav L. Slantchev, The
Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
621, 621–632, (2003). Zartman finds that two-thirds of all civil wars end
with either surrender or destruction, and Grieg finds that intrastate low
intensity conflicts are less likely to see mediation than civil wars. See I.
WILLIAM ZARTMAN ET. AL., ELUSIVE PEACE: NEGOTIATING AN END TO
CIVIL WARS 3 (I. William Zartman ed., The Brookings Institution Press
1993); J. Michael Greig, Nipping them in the Bud: The Onset of Mediation
in Low-Intensity Civil Conflicts, J. CONFLICT RES., 1–26 (2013). For our
purposes, the type of hatreds ignited, however, would lend itself to the
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to each other in this negative way, conflicts assume a zero sum
characteristic, whereby they end by either total defeat or surrender. 35
This zero sum view of war directly relates to the harms and relevant
goods in the proportionality calculation, as well as the principle of
likelihood of success. In terms of the proportionality calculation, one is
required to weigh the likely effects of waging lethal autonomous war at
T 1 on the enemy and enemy population, how those effects may affect
the potential for escalation and duration of conflict at T 2 . Moreover,
one must also calculate whether the use of AWS will create a zero-sum
environment whereby peaceful settlement and negotiation is no longer
an option for the ending of conflict and achieving of just causes. In
other words, if conflict becomes zero-sum, then the probability of
success calculation becomes even harder to estimate.
From this vantage point, we see how AWS tie together jus ad
bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum. The means by which a state
wages war - that is, the weapons and the strategies it uses to prosecute
(and end) its war - directly affect the proportionality calculations it
makes when deciding to go to war. Take the familiar example of nuclear
weapons. Many believed that waging nuclear war was clearly
disproportionate. The basis of this belief stemmed from concerns about
nuclear fallout affecting neutral parties as well as the planet. 36 An
kind of metrics identified in intrastate war, and not interstate peace
negotiations.
35.

See generally supra note 33.

36.

In 1993 the World Health Organization (WHO) requested the
International Court of Justice to consider the question of the
permissibility of the use of nuclear weapons given their adverse
environmental effects. The United Nations General Assembly in 1994
likewise asked the Court for an advisory opinion on whether there was
any circumstance where using a nuclear weapon would be permissible.
The Court did not issue an opinion to the WHO as requested, as it stated
it the WHO asked for opinions outside of its scope of the WHO’s
activities, whereas it did offer an opinion as requested by the General
Assembly. In short, the Court found that it was not illegal to possess or
threaten to use nuclear weapons; however, it also claimed that the use of
nuclear weapons must comport with international humanitarian law, as
well as the various principles of environmental law. However, upholding
environmental obligations must be balanced against the lex specialis of
international humanitarian law, particularly the principles of necessity
and proportionality. In short, any use of nuclear weapons must balance
the harmful side effects against military objectives and the use of nuclear
weapons must be necessary in that no other less harmful means would
achieve those military objectives. The Court’s opinion notwithstanding,
there is wide agreement that nuclear weapons are disproportionate in their
harmful effects and are inherently indiscriminate. See Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion of July, 1996), 35
ILM 809 & 1343 (1996); Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear
Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1996 REP. 66 (Advisory Opinion of July 8);
Richard A. Falk, Nuclear Weapons, International Law and the World
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argument about whether using AWS will satisfy ad bellum
proportionality must take into account these kinds of considerations as
well.
Additionally, the prospect of using AWS in conflict is likely to
engender another distributed negative cost: inducing an AWS arms
race. When it comes to estimating the harms in an ad bellum
proportionality calculation, we must weigh all of the potential harms,
and not, like their counterparts, only those properly related to the just
causes for war. 37 As Hurka reminds us,”[i]n assessing a war for
proportionality, it seems we count evils of all the kinds it will cause,
with no limits on their content. There is therefore a thumb pressed
down on one side of the proportionality scale, with more counting on
the negative than the positive side.” 38 Thus we must look to the
probability that if one country utilizes or begins to utilize such a tactic,
other countries may begin to justify or view as necessary their
possession and use of AWS. The result, it is argued, may actually tend
to increase the use of violent means rather than minimize them. 39
Autonomous war is thus more likely to occur as it becomes easier to
execute. This may embroil communities in more war, thereby requiring
more “skin in the game” in the long run.
Our results are counterintuitive. It appears that if a state finds
itself threatened, it seems it must be willing to sacrifice the lives of its
people as a first step for any response to be considered ad bellum
proportionate. It cannot take a short-view of war and a Panglossian40
view of technology. While states possess obligations to mitigate the
harms to their peoples, it seems they must be willing to sacrifice them
and forbear from autonomous killing. Thus, any state considering the
Court: A Historic Encounter, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 64 (1997); Michael J.
Matheson, The Opinions of the International Court of Justice on the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. (1997); NINA
TANNENWALD, THE NUCLEAR TABOO: THE UNITED STATES AND THE NONUSE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SINCE 1945 (2007).
37.

Hurka, supra note 9, at 45.

38.

Id., at 46.

39.

E.g., PETER SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR 265 (2009); Robert Sparrow,
Predators or Plowshares? Arms Control of Robotic Weapons, IEEE TECH.
& SOC’Y, Spring 2009, at 25; Jürgen Altmann, Preventive Arms Control
for Uninhabited Military Vehicles: an Ethical Issue, 15 ETHICS & INFO.
TECH. 137 (2013).

40.

Based on Voltaire’s satirical critique of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s
philosophical theory in Voltaire’s work Candide. Embodied in the
character of the tutor Pangloss: “Pangloss taught…that there is no effect
without a cause and that, in this best of all possible worlds…everything is
made for an end, [therefore] everything is necessarily for the best end.”
VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE 18–24, 42 (Daniel Gordon ed. & trans., Bedford/St.
Martin’s Press 1999).
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use of AWS must take a longer view of war. In particular, it must look
past the immediate loss of its “boys” to the lives of its people, as well
as probability of escalation, peaceful negotiation and settlement, and
unintended weapons proliferation and arms races. Paradoxically, the
obligation to mitigate harm to one’s people may sometimes require
placing some of those people in harm’s way.
The obvious objection to this account is that it seems morally
perverse to require a state to use human warfighters carrying
conventional weapons and endanger their lives. 41 If one can fight and
not pay in blood, then a just war theory that required harm, when there
exists a possibility of incurring no harm, seems at best incoherent.
While this sentiment should not be easily dismissed, as there are
important concerns here, I think it misses the importance of the scope
of ad bellum proportionality calculations. Proportionality requires that
states are able to balance the relevant good against the evil they impose
through warfare.
Typically, this is seen as a balancing of harms on both sides. Yet if
we view the response to aggression in a one-round game perspective,
such as that in Scenario One, then we misrepresent our calculations.
We posit that we are satisfied in a just cause, that AWS may offer a
reasonable chance of success, that they might be the last resort (though
given their “costlessness” this is debatable), that the response would be
waged by a proper authority, and given the justness of the cause and
the “costless” nature, the response seems proportionate. We could
pursue our rights with no harm to ourselves and only incidental harm
to an unjust aggressor.
I hope that my arguments here have shown that such a position
should not be so easily accepted. Indeed, we have good theoretical and
empirical reasons to be skeptical of these arguments. While I have
assumed that the defensive use of AWS would also be in isolation from
human combatants, which is of course unlikely in the near term, the
thought experiment is helpful. The just war tradition is a regulative
body of thought. Justifying war is not, and should not be, an easy
business. My arguments here have assumed a clearly unjust threat and
thus the justness of the cause. However, it is more often the case that
such clarity is lacking. Often both sides to a conflict view their causes
as just and both often invoke their rights of self-defense. Even terrorists

41.

See generally Kenneth Anderson & Matthew C. Waxman, Law and Ethics
for Autonomous Weapon Systems: Why a Ban Won’t Work and How the
INST.
(Apr.
9,
2013),
Laws
of
War
Can,
HOOVER
http://www.hoover.org/research/law-and-ethics-autonomous-weaponsystems-why-ban-wont-work-and-how-laws-war-can (arguing, inter alia,
that the proliferation of AWS outside the law of armed conflict would
entice belligerents to hold enemy civilians hostage more often than they
might using conventional means of war).
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claim their actions as just and as responses to aggression.42 But if we
are to be prudent and claim that using AWS does not appear to satisfy
ad bellum proportionality in theory, we should be very wary of
attempting to do so in practice. For in practice, the case will likely be
even more opaque. Technological superiority does not entail success,
and technological hubris raises all the dangers Camus rightly noted.

42.

See Jeffrey P. Whitman, Is Just War Theory Obsolete?, in ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF ETHICS AND WAR 23, 29 (Fritz Allhoff, et al. eds., 2013)
(describing how one of al-Qaeda’s justifications for its terrorist attacks
was the liberation of the land of the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and
Medina from the influence of “the armies of the American Crusaders and
their allies”).
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